83 Phil 171
Facts:
Shinegori Kuroda, a former lieutenant-general of the Japanese Imperial Army and commanding general of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines was charged before the Philippine Military Commission for war crimes. Being the commanding general of the enemy forces during the war period, he was tried for failing to discharge his duties well and permitting the brutal atrocities and other high crimes committed by his men against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Japanese forces, in clear violation of the laws and customs of war.
Kuroda, in his petition, argues that the Military Commission is not a valid court because the law that created it, Executive Order No. 68, is unconstitutional. He further contends that using as basis the Hague Convention’s Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare for the war crimes committed cannot stand ground as the Philippines was not a signatory of such rules in such convention. Furthermore, he alleges that the United States is not a party of interest in the case and that the two US prosecutors cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.
2. Whether or not the US is a party of interest to this case.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, creating the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules on the trial of accused war criminals is constitutional as it is aligned with Sec. 3, Article 2 of the Constitution which states that, “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.” The generally accepted principles of international law includes those formed during the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention and other international jurisprudence established by the United Nations. These include the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses in violation of laws and customs of war, are to be held accountable. In the doctrine of incorporation, the Philippines abides by these principles and therefore has a right to try persons that commit such crimes and most especially when it is committed againsts its citizens. It abides with it even if it was not a signatory to these conventions by the mere incorporation of such principles in the constitution.
The United States is a party of interest because the country and its people have been equally, if not more greatly, aggrieved by the crimes with which the petitioner is charged for. By virtue of Executive Order No. 68, the Military Commission is a special military tribunal and that the rules as to parties and representation are not governed by the rules of court but by the very provisions of this special law.
J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing
G.R. No. 65366 October 25, 1983
Facts:
Issue:
Whether or not the Anti-Bases Coalition should be allowed to hold a peaceful protest rally in front of the US Embassy.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled to allow the rally in front of the US Embassy to protect the exercise of the rights to free speech and of peaceful assembly and on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of the permit. These rights are not only assured by our constitution but also provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Between the two generally accepted principles of diplomatic relations and human rights, the latter takes higher ground. The exercise of the right of freedom of expression and of peaceful assembly is highly ranked in the scheme of constitutional values.
Tanada vs Angara
272 SCRA 18 May 2, 1997
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate ratifying such WTO Agreement.The present petition was filed assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates Section 19, Article II of the Constitution, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII thereof, providing for the “Filipino first” policy.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.”The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement, thereby making it “a part of the law of the land”. The Supreme Court must give due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
Agustin vs Edu
88 SCRA 195
Facts:
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of Letter of Instruction No. 229 issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from a vehicle when it is stalled or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing compliance with such Instruction. This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.
Issue:
Whether or not Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such were established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations, and that such Letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways.
Mejoff vs Director of Prisons
90 Phil 70 September 26, 1951
This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied in a decision of this Court on July 30, 1949. "The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in these Islands. Upon liberation, he was arrested as a Japanese spy by U. S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps. Thereafter, the People's Court ordered his release. But the Deportation Board taking his case up found that having no travel documents, Mejoff was an illegal alien in this country, and consequently referred the matter to the immigration authorities. After the corresponding investigation, the Immigration Board of Commissioners declared on April 5, 1948 that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally in 1944, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designated port of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. The petitioner was then under custody, he having been arrested on March 18, 1948. In October 1948, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities moved him to Bilibid Prison at Muntinglupa where he has been confined up to the present time, inasmuch as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under detention while arrangements for his departure are being made. Two years having elapsed since the aforesaid decision was promulgated, the Government has not found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are in sight, although, it should be said in fairness to the deportation authorities that it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country would take the petitioner.
Ruling:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution of the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation." And in a resolution entitled, "Universal Declaration Of Human Rights," and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, of which the Philippines is a member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. It was there resolved that "all human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status" (Art. 2); that "every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9 ); etc. Premises considered, the writ will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance shall be reasonable and the question of reasonableness shall be submitted to this Court or to the Court of First Instance of Manila for decision in case of abuse. No costs will be charged.